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PIRACY OF MALACCA STRAITS : THREAT TO NATIONAL SECURITY*

Introduction

In June 2005, Lloyd’s Market Association Joint War Committee added the Straits of Malacca to a list of 21 areas it deemed high risk for merchant ships and prone to war, strikes, terrorism and other such perils (Roach 2005: 102). Piracy in Malacca Strait has happened as early as AD 414. By the late nineteenth century, piracy was largely eliminated in Southeast Asia by European colonial powers, but it was never completely eradicated (Young & Valencia 2003:271).

The post-Cold War era has seen the ideological struggle that had constrained the regional or local conflict came to an end. A quantum leap in the violence potential threshold of pirates are now taking advantage from the weaponry left over from wars in Afghanistan and Cambodia, resulted in the pirate assaults becoming more lethal (Chalk 1997: 33). Financial Crisis 1997 was believed to have encouraged the lower income people to take part in this illegal activity. In addition, the political instability followed by the fall of former Indonesian president Suharto regime, and with the widespread corruption and loose political control, creates an environment in which piracy ignored or even tacitly enabled by corrupt military elements who may share the booty (Young & Valencia 2003: 274).

Importance of Malacca Strait

Every year, more than 60,000 (IMO 2003) ships pass through the Strait of Malacca (Forbes 2004: 1) carrying various cargoes, from crude oil to finished products from all over the world. This number is clearly three times the number of ships that navigate through the Panama Canal and more than double the number that uses the Suez Canal. The strait, which connect the Indian Ocean to the South China Sea and the Pacific Ocean, are one of the busiest ocean highways in the world. One third of the world trade is passing through the strait, making it to be touted as the artery of the world economy (Mokhzani 2005:1).

Definition of Piracy

According to International Maritime Organization (IMO), a specialized agency within United Nations, “piracy” is defined as violence on the high seas or exclusive economic zones, and that it cannot occur in territorial seas, archipelagic waters or internal waters. However, in Southeast Asian, most sea robberies occur in territorial waters (Young & Valencia 2003:270; Roach 2005:101). On the other hand, International Maritime Bureau (IMB), a specialized division of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) uses the term “piracy and robbery against ships” to describe all acts against merchant ships wherever located, whether or not the act fits within the legal definition of piracy (Roach 2005: 101).

Of all the 330 incidents worldwide reported to the IMO in 2004, 113 occurred in the South China Sea and 60 took place in the Straits of Malacca, amounting to more than half of the global total. During the first half of 2005, of the 113 incidents reported worldwide to the IMO, the South China Sea accounted for 48 and the Straits of Malacca 12, again making up over half of the incidents reported (Ibid). According to the IMB record, of the 325 reports of actual ad attempted attacks worldwide in 2004, 46 were in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore; of the 127 such reports for the first half of 2005, 14 were in the straits (Ibid: 102). However, the figures may be underreported by commercial ships, because by making a report, the ship may be idles for days. With the operational costs of about US$25,000 per day and the worry of owners’ reputation as a commercial shipper, as well as the increase of insurance premiums, there are incentives not to report (Young & Valencia 2003: 271).

Theoretical Approach

According to Barry Buzan, “national security is thus simultaneously both a valid and necessary expression of the self-help measures that life in the international anarchy forces on states” (Buzan 1989:2 ). Buzan also stressed that, “in an anarchy, no state can achieve national security purely by its own efforts, and so national security depends importantly on the overall pattern of security interdependence in the international system.” (Ibid:4).

Kamarulnizam and Mahmud opined that three national core values for national security is sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political, social, economic and cultural survival (1998:153). Sovereignty of Malaysia means the state is free to run its internal and external affairs without the interference of foreign power. In the context of Malaysia's strategic security interests, focus is given to three major aspects: 1) the interests to defend and preserve the internal order, 2) the interests to defend the national territory and local boundary; 3) the interests to balance the regional powers such as China in the context of cooperation of ASEAN (Ibid:156).

Malaysia has to be able to defend its borders and its own territory. Malaysia is a maritime country with a long coastal line with most of the neighbouring countries. The sea area of Malaysia include Malacca Strait, Singapore Strait, Gulf of Thailand,South China Sea and Sulu Sea (Ibid:160). Malacca Strait, include the shorter sea route of Sunda Strait, Lombok and Makasar is a strategic area in terms of economics and security in the international commerce system.

International Legal Framework

Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore are party to the UN Law of the Sea Convention, but Thailand is not a party. However, this convention did not defined piracy in territorial waters as piracy. But this definition very much hamper the effort to curtail piracy as most of the piracy in Southeast Asia are taking place in territorial waters, and thus does not covered by this convention. It is estimated that 80 percent of the attacks that occur in Southeast Asia are dismissed as common “raiding” simply because they take place in the archipelagic waters or Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) of particular states (Chalk 1997:37). Chalk has argued that the majority of attacks taken place in the Malacca and Singapore Straits have occurred in Indonesian rather than Malaysian or Singaporean waters does seem to provide evidence of pirates being aware of and respecting international boundaries (Ibid)

For the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA Convention) that was supported by U.S., Malaysia and Indonesia are not party whereas Singapore is a party. The only agreement adopted by four littoral states is Asian Regional Anti-Piracy Agreement, but it is not yet in force (Roach 2005: 106). Hence, it is concluded that the present legal framework to deal with piracy does not fully address the problem as it has manifested itself in Southeast Asia (Chalk 1997:36).

Conflation between Piracy and Terrorism

Maritime terrorism gained much attention ever since the Muslim militants in Yemen blew a hole in an American warship, the USS Cole in 2000 and another in a French oil tanker in Limburg, 2002 (Economist 2004). In recent years, it was clear that there was a tendency to conflate the piracy and terrorism in Malacca Strait by the media and government officers. Though the root causes that breeding the piracy and terrorism might be similar, the objective of piracy and terrorism are very much different. Piracy is an economic crime done for financial gain, the principal causes can be sought in prevailing economic conditions (Young & Valencia 2003:274). However, the political objective of terrorists is generally political and religious ideology stemming from perceived injustices, both historical and contemporary (Ibid: 276).

Many reports have pointed out that U.S. has seen the extremists in Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand as potential threats to world commercial flowing through Southeast Asian seaways. Some officials saw the violent and well-coordinated pirate attacks in the straits as a dry run for a terror attack on shipping. U.S. has pressed for other countries to sign SUA Convention, but the fear of compromising the national sovereignty that the obligation of the convention will eventually allow the foreign forces to pursue terrorists and pirates in their waters have made them refused to sign it (Young & Valencia 2003:277; Roach 2005:102). Worse still is the U.S. has little confidence in the capacity and will of Southeast Asian countries to prevent such a disaster. U.S. has even suggested to team up with Malaysian navy to deploy a special forces on high-speed boats to counter pirates. But, Malaysia has repeatedly rejected the plan, and reiterated that the patrolling of U.S. would violate Malaysia’s sovereignty (Burnett 2005:1). In line with her global war on terror, U.S. again attempt to exert her influence in Southeast Asian by using the name of terror, though many experts have strike off the possibility of any linkage between piracy and terrorists groups in the region. So far, there have yet to see any incident directly or indirectly link to the terrorism in the Malacca Strait, a situation much different from what has happened to Abu Sayyaf group in the Southern Philippines.

The U.S. has co-operated with India to escort commercial vessels of “high value” transiting the strait in order to control piracy and terrorism. However, naval patrol by major powers is not an effective way or politically accepted (Young & Valencia 2003: 277). The sheer size of these vessels may inhibit their effectiveness in pursuing pirates using small high-speed craft who have intimate knowledge of the surrounding waters (Ibid: 280). The joint patrols of U.S. and Indian naval also raised unnecessary suspicion of Southeast Asian states. For them, these exercises merely reflected the close U.S.- Indian military partnership in exert their presence and influence in Malacca Strait. A recent controversial nuclear deal sealed between U.S. and India added to this belief (BBC 2006). The team up of U.S. and India might be seen as a threat to China. The rise of China as a potential threat to U.S. global primacy has been the focus of U.S. foreign policy ever since the end of post Cold War. US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has claimed that China could become a "negative force" in the region. It raises the concern that the recent trilateral security dialogue with U.S. closest allies in the Pacific - Australia and Japan, will become a new Cold War-type alliance in which China has cast as the adversary in the beginning ( Mokhzani & Nizam 2005:3; Roach 2005:101).

Malacca Strait is an important shipping route, in terms of oil import for Northeast Asian states, especially for the new economic powerhouse of the world, China. China currently imports 58% of oil from the Middle East. Some have forecast that China alone will account for one-third of the increase, which will see demand growth doubling to nearly 30 million barrel per day in 2025, from 14.5 million barrel per day in 2000. Given its strategic importance to China’s economic survival, no doubt that China has claimed that she would use her naval might to ensure these sea lane remain open (Mokhzani & Nizam 2005:3; Roach 2005: 101). China’s rapid economic development and consolidating of military might have made her a potential challenger to U.S. primacy. The competition would see the U.S. adopting the strategies to curtail China’s rising influence, including controlling the vital sea-lines of communication (SLOC) and strategic maritime chokepoints such as Malacca Strait, in order to indirectly control the movement of raw materials and goods to China (Mokhzani & Nizam 2005: 4).

Another regional power, Japan, is the world’s fourth largest energy consumer and second largest energy importer of oil. Japan imports as much as 88% of crude oil from Persian Gulf countries (Mokhzani 2005:7). As a user state of Malacca Strait, the strategic importance to Japanese economy drew their attention, and that its Defense Agency chief Yoshinori Ono offered to help curb piracy in the Malacca Strait during his visit to Singapore and Malaysia and was told they would accept as long as it does not infringe on their sovereignty (Japantimes 2005).

As pointed out by Buzan, the holistic security analysis must set the regional subsystem into the larger pattern of global security defined by the great powers. How do the great powers impinge not only on the domestic life of local states, but also on their national security policies and on the dynamics of their regional security system? (Buzan 1989:12). Given the geopolitical importance of Malacca Strait to the race of global leadership and economy growth of Northeast Asian, inevitably that Malaysia, together with other littoral states, are tasked to preserve the maritime security in Malacca Strait.

Malaysia’s Stand to the Piracy Problems in Malacca Strait

Malaysia is one of the key players in the Straits of Malacca security debate because of almost half of the Straits lies in Malaysian territorial waters. Due to the colonialism history, Malaysia always sought an independent foreign policy, one with the concepts of absolute sovereignty and non-interference to its land. For Malaysia, the first and foremost is to maintain sovereignty in her territorial waters, keeping all foreign powers out of Malaysian waters. On April 2004, Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister Najib Tun Razak stated that, “ control of the straits was the sovereign prerogative of Malaysia and Indonesia, and U.S. military involvement are not welcome” (MIMA Bulletin 2004). This meant that under no circumstances would US forces or another super power be allowed into Malaysian waters. However, Malaysian adjusted its stance in June 2005 by saying that “ if the international community wants to help it will have to comply with two basic principles, the first is the sovereignty of states –Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore – cannot be violated. The second principle is that these three countries are the one responsible for maintaining security in the zone.” (Valencia 2005:371).

Singapore proposed the idea of enlisting US troops to help patrol the Straits, the narrow shipping lane between Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore that is vital to world trade but notorious for pirate attacks. Malaysia also has pledged to help wipe out piracy on the Strait, but Defense Minister Najib Tun Razak, stressed that US counter-terrorism forces in the region would fuel Islamic fanaticism (Bingley 2004:380), as an US military presence in Southeast Asia could prove to be a magnet for the very groups Southeast Asian governments are wary of. The rejection of a US military presence is understandable as the national security of developing states like Malaysia is very much defined in terms of regime survival. The U.S. presence in the region would surely challenge the legitimacy of the regime in power as Malaysia's Malay-Muslim majority population in particular are critical of U.S. hegemonic power. Majority Muslims protested against the U.S.-led occupation in Iraq and see the United States as an ally of Israel, which has occupied Palestinian territories. Malaysia’s ruling power could not afford to be seen working closely with U.S. especially in the realm of military.

For the very latest progressive effort on combating piracy, Deputy Prime Minister Datuk Seri Najib Razak said incidences of piracy in the straits had declined dramatically since 2004, and there was no evidence that these attacks had any link to global terrorism. Launching the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA), Najib said there had only been one pirate attack in Malaysian waters in the straits between June and December last year, contrasting with the 18 cases reported in the corresponding period in 2004. Najib added by saying, "One of the efforts we have taken is to set up the MMEA as a more concerted and integrated means to patrol our waterways.If before we had 11 different agencies involved in maritime security and tasks, now we have one agency with the authority and power to do so.”(New Straits Times 2006)

Malaysia’s another interest in the Strait is economy. Malaysia is a maritime trading nation and the 10^th largest trading partner of the US. Malaysia and United States recently signed a trade and investment framework agreement (TIFA) aimed at breaking down trade barriers and increasing trade between the two nations (Ibid). The Straits of Malacca set to become ever more than important for Malaysia economically especially with the Northeast Asian countries’ fastest growing economy in the world.

Other Littoral States’ Responses

Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore claim territorial right over the vast majority of the Straits. Indonesia and Malaysia claim the most sovereign territory in the Straits and they are the most fiercely protections of their sovereign rights. According to the 1982 UNCLOS III they have every right to act this way, given that maritime territorial waters are treated in the same way as land-based territory in regards to policing. Due to the current situation, any state wanting to influence security decisions and paradigms in the Straits of Malacca must influence the key littoral states of Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia (Ibid: 355).

According to Roach, the difficulty of protecting shipping from these threats results from the fact that criminals and law enforcement officials are not bound by the same rules. Criminals do not respect maritime borders or nation sovereignty (Roach 2005:98). The littoral states have been reluctant to cooperate among themselves to make their maritime boundaries effectively permeable for action by other states’ law enforcement forces. Lack of the mutual trust was the reason cited for the law enforcement vessels not allowed to enter foreign territorial seas, thus creates havens for the criminals (Roach 2005: 103; Burnett 2005:1). This was exactly the problem that has been pointed out by Buzan, that the structure in Southeast Asia is defined by a pattern of relations among several medium-sized powers. No single country can easily threaten to dominate the local security environment (Buzan 1989:10). In Southeast Asia, there is no state capable of playing the role of hegemonic leader. As a consequence, regional co-operation is forced to follow the difficult path of consensus-building (Ibid:26).

In 2004, the chiefs of the armed forces of Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore launched trilateral coordinated patrols of the straits, code-named MALSINDO Malacca Straits Coordinated Patrols, however, appear to have had little success. The ASEAN Regional Forum had in 2005 noted the areas for cooperation against piracy, however it still remained to be seen the extent of cooperation that will be achieved (Roach 2005:108). A more significant work by the littoral states included Thailand is the standard operating procedures for coordinated security patrols and aerial surveillance proposed by Malaysia in August 2005. The “Eyes in the Sky” patrol commenced in 2005 could be considered one of the constructive effort; first, to avert the presence of the U.S. or any foreign naval in Malacca Strait; second, to minimize the sensitivity of littoral states over the issue of sovereignty; thirdly, building up the mutual trust of the cooperating states. The IMO figure showed that in the final quarter of 2005, only one incident has happened in the Malacca Strait might suggest that the aerial patrol starts to bear fruit in combating piracy.

Conclusion

Piracy is driven by economic reasons. This “piracy” will continue to provide opportunity for the great power to interfere with the security affairs in the Malacca Strait as long as it lingering around. Many are skeptical about the likelihood whether the ASEAN members will begin to institutionalize cooperation to the extent needed to strengthen regional cohesion to resolve crucial problems arising from their growing interdependence, and to revive their collective diplomatic influence in Asia’s wider international relations (Felker 2004: 378). Nonetheless the piracy of Malacca Strait has strengthen the fact that if the littoral states continue refuse to cooperate, the spillover effect of possible rivalry sparked by the competition of leadership between U.S. and China will somehow influence the politics of these states included Malaysia.

Malaysia realizes that in order to maintain undiluted sovereignty in this post Sept 11 world, it must prove itself to be a capable security actor. In combating piracy, not only Malaysia secures its economical prosperity, but also manage to defend its sovereignty from the interference of the outside power. However, the fact remain that none of the states bordering the Straits of Malacca and Singapore alone can satisfactorily defend their territorial integrity against criminal who has no respect for national borders (Roach 2005:111). The U.S. pressure over the security of Malacca Strait sent a signal to the littoral states including Malaysia that it is for their common interests to work together with mutual respect to safeguard the maritime security of Malacca Strait without undermine their sovereignty, territorial integrity as well as economic interests.

The calculation of Malaysia’s national interests in international arena via the Malacca Strait dispute clearly showed Malaysia’s assertive stand on preserving its sovereignty. U.S. geopolitical interests goes parallel with its war on terror globally, but Malaysia, as an autonomy state, despite its relative weak power, might not necessary fall under the pressure of U.S. Terrorism is used according to the need and defined interests of U.S. A more consolidate mechanism needs to be built up for Malacca Strait as we can foresee that the competition of powers between U.S. and China as well as other regional powers such India, Japan and South Korea are going to be intense in future. The national interests of littoral states including Malaysia should not, and need not take a backseat for the interests of the superpower. As pointed by Hans Morgenthau, “there is no law-enforcing agency above the individual nations, and there are no overwhelming moral and social pressure to which they could be subjected. Thus they are bound always to pursue what they regard to be their own national interests.” (Morgenthau 1973: 410).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

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*This article has been written together with Mrs Ng Boon Hooi

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